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Abstract
The nature of public governance has changed over the past few decades which has led
to increased interest in the study of governments working with residents to coproduceservices. The literature identifies different types of co-production including
individual, group and collective and it also identifies factors associated with coproduction. This paper explores the factors associated with co-production of services at
the municipal level. This study uses a case study methodology focusing on the City of
Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy. The case study was conducted through
review of publicly available planning documents, media reports and key informant
interviews. The study finds that Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy was
designed as a form of co-production and that co-production did take place. Several
factors identified in the literature were found to be present in the case study, but several
were not.

iii

Table of Contents
Abstract ...........................................................................................................................................ii
Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 1
Literature Review ......................................................................................................................... 3
Co-Production Defined .......................................................................................................................... 3
What factors support government use of co-production? ................................................................ 7

Methodology................................................................................................................................ 15
Analysis ........................................................................................................................................ 18
Overview of Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy (NAS) ................................................... 18
Hamilton’s NAS As An Example of Co-production ......................................................................... 23
Implementation of Co-production Approach .................................................................................... 27

Findings ....................................................................................................................................... 39
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 44
Works Cited ................................................................................................................................. 46

Introduction
The role of government has shifted significantly since the later part of the 20th century
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Bourgon, 2011). Traditional understandings of public
administration see governments as having the power, authority and capacity to solve
significant social problems, but increasingly, governments have experienced a reduced
ability to act in a unilateral manner. This is linked to the necessity of dealing with
increasingly complex policy problems, reduced resources, changing expectations from
citizens and increasing speed of communications (Bourgon, 2011). Bourgon (2011)
sums it up explaining that complexity and breadth of many policy issues simply
surpasses any single government’s ability to affect change on their own, necessitating
partnerships with other governments, for-profit and non-profit groups. This view is
shared by Bovaird (2007, p. 846) who writes that “policy is now seen as the negotiated
outcome of many interacting policy systems, not simply the preserve of policy planners
and top decision makers.”

Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) suggest that the shift necessitates that governments
must change how they understand their role. They describe the change as a move from
“steering to serving.” This changing role involves helping the public to articulate their
common interests rather than assuming that they know the public interest and are best
positioned to act on it. Working with citizens to co-produce services has emerged as a
strategy to respond to government’s changing role (Bourgon, 2011; Bovaird 2007).
Loeffler and Bovaird (2016, p. 1006) define co-production as “…public services, service
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users and communities making better use of each other’s assets and resources to
achieve better outcomes or improved efficiency.” This definition makes it clear that coproduction can occur with both individuals and groups. Co-production of public services
is seen to have several potential benefits including improving efficiency of services,
mobilizing resources that were not previously available, and increasing citizen trust
(Bovaird, 2007; Loeffler and Bovaird, 2016).

Despite its potential benefits, co-production of public services is not universally
embraced by public administrators and public administration theorists. Bovaird (2007)
notes practical concerns including transaction costs as well as normative concerns
about co-production diluting public accountability, potentially being biased toward higher
income residents and placing a disproportionate burden on marginalized communiities.
Numerous lines of research have attempted to better understand when and where coproduction is most likely to occur. One line of research has identified a variety of factors
that deter public administrators and politicians from engaging with citizens to coproduce services (Simrell King, Feltey, & O'Neill Susel, 1998; Ventriss, 2016). Another
line has focused on studying the factors that increase the likelihood of governments
engaging in co-production (Fledderus, Brandsen, & Honingh, 2014). Yet another has
focused on changing organizational and individual practices to fully embrace the use of
co-production in service delivery (Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2006).

This study will apply this literature to the municipal government setting in Ontario using
the City of Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy as a case study. It will describe
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the City of Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy, explore the extent to which it
meets the definition of co-production and then assess the extent to which factors
presented in the literature as increasing the likelihood of public administrators engaging
in co-production are present in Hamilton.

Literature Review
Co-Production Defined
Co-production goes beyond efforts by government to engage citizens and inform policy
choices. It is about governments and citizens working together to jointly produce public
services. Joshi and Moore (2004, p. 40) offer the following definition, “Institutionalised
co-production is the provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation)
through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised groups
of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions”. By reference to
“institutional co-production,” Joshi and Moore exclude temporary arrangements and
those that are not grounded in a formalized institutional arrangement such as an
unplanned emergency response in which government and citizens may spontaneously
join together to address the urgent situation at hand.

Another definition is offered by Loeffler and Bovaird (2016, p. 1006) stating that coproduction is “…public services, service users and communities making better use of
each other’s assets and resources to achieve better outcomes or improved efficiency”.
Their definition highlights that both government and citizens bring assets to the process,
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in contrast to the understanding of citizens merely bringing opinions and relying on
government to supply resources. This implies a higher level of investment for both
parties. Loeffler and Bovaird go on to explain that co-production is a more intensive
form of citizen engagement as it speaks to joint action, not merely the articulation of
preferences to be fulfilled by a government or other organization. For the purposes of
this study, Loeffler and Bovaird’s definition will be adopted for simplicity and focus on
mutual investment.

The co-production literature distinguishes between participation by individuals and
groups. Brudney and England (1983) employ a typology distinguishing between
individual, group, and collective co-production. The typology focuses not just on who is
involved, but on the distribution of benefits. Individual co-production can be seen as an
inherent part of many types of service delivery including public health and social
services. With these services, a government employee provides an intervention, but the
outcome is dependent on the service recipient producing the outcome through their own
actions such as changing health behaviours or securing employment. Individual coproduction can be “captured” in which participation is required through legislation or the
offering of benefits. With individual co-production, the benefits are accrued initially by
the individual themselves and secondarily at a population level.

Group co-production, on the other hand, is focused on increasing the quality or quantity
of benefits received by a specific group. The benefits are generally enjoyed directly by
a circumscribed group which may already enjoy advantages of wealth or power. An
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example would be a conservation authority working with members of a private golf club
to plan for shared management of wetlands.

Collective co-production is distinct in that it offers benefits to a broader group of citizens
beyond those engaged in the activity. Brudney and England (1983 P. 64) write that
“Inherent in the definition of collective coproduction is the notion of a redistribution of
benefits from citizen activity. Regardless of which citizens participate in the service
delivery process, the benefits accrue to the city as a collectivity”.

Whether co-production is at the individual, group or collective level, citizens can play a
variety of roles. In their meta-analysis of the literature on co-production, Voorberg,
Bekkers, and Tummers (2015) identify three primary roles for citizens including coinitiator, co-designer, and co-implementer. The role of initiator speaks to participation in
framing a program or policy response and could even extend to direct participation in
commissioning. Co-designing could involve citizen participation in developing a project
or program including its framing and specification. The co-implementer role is the most
frequently studied and involves citizens playing a role, however big or small, in the
direct delivery of the service. Co-production does not require that all these roles are
played by citizens in every occurrence.

Co-production at each level can be seen to have different dynamics. At the individual
level, government works with citizens individually to produce individual benefits. This
type of co-production is often about individual behavior change and involves a singular

6
relationship. Benefits accrue to society at a population level as the impact of many
individuals making changes accumulates and citizen motivation may be self-interested
or altruistic. At the group level, governments work with citizens who are organized into
a common interest group such as members of a golf club or other voluntary association.
The members of the group will directly benefit from their effort. Since they will directly
benefit, they have a high motivation to participate and the relationship is between
government and the group. This study is interested in collective co-production as it
focuses on governments working with groups of citizens who are coming together to
work toward a public goal that will benefit all citizens.

Governments must be aware of the limitations of co-production for citizens. Given the
wide array of demands on their time, citizens can burn out after prolonged involvement
with co-production activities. A free-rider problem can also emerge with citizens taking
advantage of the benefit achieved through co-production without contributing to it.
Direct involvement with co-production can also result in a form of capture and limit the
ability of groups to lobby government. Some practical challenges include differences in
the values held by co-producing parties, unclear division of roles and incompatible
incentives. Each of these challenges would make it very had to secure and maintain
engagement of citizens. Another limitation is that co-production can blur lines of
accountability, making it hard to hold parties to account (Bovaird, 2007).

Sumrall King et al. (1998) identify three types of barriers to increased citizen
participation in co-production. The first is the competing demands of daily life. Being
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involved in these types of activities requires time and resources. When these are
absent, citizens are much less likely to become involved. Administrative processes that
engage people too late or in ineffective ways were also identified as barriers as they
may become discouraged by the lack of meaningful input. Following from this,
techniques used to engage citizens can also become barriers. Some techniques, such
as public hearings, are too one-sided and advisory councils are often not sufficiently
representative of the community.

A survey of residents of five cities in the United Kingdom explored factors associated
with citizen decisions to engage in individual and collective co-production (Bovaird et al.
2016). The researchers found that individual and collective co-production have different
characteristics and correlates. Both individual and collective co-production were found
to be positively associated with citizens’ sense of self-efficacy and an overall sense of
satisfaction with with government consultation on the issue. While this research is
primarily concerned with factors associated with government use of co-production, this
highlights the importance of understanding what influences citizens’ decision to
participate.

What organizational factors support government use of co-production?
Co-production differs significantly from traditional understandings of government’s role
as the sole provider of services to citizens. The question naturally arises as to what
factors support the use of collective co-production. Factors can be grouped into
organizational factors and individual staff factors. This first section focuses on
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organizational factors associated with co-production. Joshi and Moore (2004) indicate
that co-production is spurred by governance or logistical drivers. In the context of their
study of co-production in developing countries, they talk about governance drivers as
relating to diminished legitimacy or capacity to govern and logistical drivers as relating
to technical challenges for government to provide services directly. Governance drivers
may look different in developed countries, but still exist. Bourgon’s (2011) writing
suggests that in a developed country, governance drivers might relate to complex policy
issues of overlapping jurisdiction where no single government or organization can act
unilaterally to achieve the necessary outcome. Technical challenges can certainly exist
in the developed countries as well. For example, rural municipalities may work with
groups of citizens to run far-flung community halls because it may not make financial
sense for the municipality to staff a little-used facility directly.

Perhaps the most significant factor is that of a government’s willingness to share power
with citizens (Arnstein, 1969). Fundamental to the concept of co-production is that
citizens are given much greater power to determine the nature of the problem, the
method to solve it as well as participating in the implementation. Ventriss (2016)
suggests that in arguing for co-production writers have not sufficiently addressed the
implications for the distribution of power between citizens and government officials.
Without acknowledging the asymmetrical distribution of power between governments
and citizens, it would be impossible to address the underlying dynamic for governments
to engage citizens in the co-production of public services.
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Fledderus, Brandsen & Honingh (2015) note that co-production can affect governments
and citizens differently. They write that “…although co-production of public service
delivery decreases uncertainty for users, it seems to increase uncertainty for
organizations (p. 152)”. Uncertainty is reduced for citizens because they have the
opportunity be directly involved in the delivery of the services ensuring that their needs
and preferences are addressed. In contrast, involving citizens in the delivery of services
can reduce the predictability of the process and the outcome for government. This
uncertainty can make government less willing to engage in co-production.

Fledderus et al. (2015) suggest that organizations can take a closed or open system
approach to reducing uncertainty. Closed systems manage uncertainty by adapting
internal processes to reduce uncertainty which can result in the exclusion of groups who
may introduce variability. In can also result in limiting the ability of process participants
to actually affect the outcome by reducing opportunities for input for carefully controlling
the range of input that can be provided. The efforts to reduce uncertainty can frustrate
process particpants and reduce trust in government. In contrast, an open system
approach can also be taken, which recognizes fragmentation. Open systems focus on
the benefits of uncertainty and negotiate levels of involvement for process participants.
As part of this, they also deal with the uncertainty by discussing it with staff and users.
To foster co-production, Ventriss (2016) suggests that that governments adopt a “copossibility approach” that promotes a learning environment that encourages
experimentation, innovation and disaggregated policy making. For Ventriss (2016),
governments need to adopt a culture of substantive learning where new information is
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integrated in ways that can shift the underlying rules for policy making. Another aspect
of this approach is a move toward increased use of disaggregated policy making. This
means focusing on policy-making at smaller, more local levels to recognize the
heterogeneity of citizens.

In their systematic review of literature on co-production, Voorberg, Bekkers and
Tummers (2015, p. 1342) found that the most frequently identified influential factor was
“compatibility of public organizations with citizen participation.” It is worth noting that it
was identified in nearly 50% of the articles, more than double the next most frequently
identified factor. This category in their study included several varied concepts including
the presence of supportive organizational structures, policies or communication
infrastructure. It follows that having structures or policies that invite public participation
would support its use and decrease barriers for staff.

Risk aversion is identified as another influential factor relating to co-production
(Voorberg et al., 2015 & Loeffler and Bovaird 2016). Increasing the involvement of
citizens in public decision-making can be perceived to increase the level of risk either
because participation may be less predictable or the outcome may be less certain. This
uncertainty could be perceived to reflect negatively on public administrator’s
performance. It can also reflect layers of approval that may be required within some
organizations.
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The final factor identified in Voorberg et al.’s (2015) systematic review was the,
“presence of clear incentives for co-creation.” Consistent with the earlier discussion
about uncertainty, co-production could seem unlikely to yield outcomes worth the
potential risk to some administrators. Additionally, public servants could see citizens as
unreliable either in terms of commitment or knowledge. This could stem from a
fundamental belief that people will only act in their self-interest or that they simply do not
possess the knowledge or skills to meaningfully contribute (Cooper et al., 2006). A lack
of clear incentives speaks to a paucity of rewards for public servants. One imagines
that their decision to engage in co-production involves a calculation of many factors and
that many individual and organizational factors would create inertia.

What individual staff factors are associated with co-production
Other researchers find that the attitudes, beliefs and skills of individual public
administrators determine the likelihood that they will engage in co-production (Voorberg
et al., 2015). This was the second most frequently cited factor in Voorberg et al.’s
systematic review. This broad category includes a variety of concepts including, staff
belief in the value of citizen participation, belief in the effectiveness of citizen
participation, as well as reluctance to lose status and control. Concerns about the loss
of professional status are also identified as a barrier to co-prodution by Loeffler and
Bovaird (2016). These concerns could stem from a professionally ingrained expectation
that the public administrator’s power and influence comes come their expertise in a
content area. Underlying this support must be a willingness on the part of politicians
and management to give up control (Loeffler and Bovaird, 2016). Relating to this is the
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need for support from politicians and senior leadership, without which staff will be
hesitant to act. It is especially important for their support to be expressed publicly. This
is especially true when things go wrong (Bovaird, 2007). The belief that co-production
takes strong leadership from the top may be justified leading to the conclusion that
organizations with healthy distributed leadership may be in the best position to adopt
co-production (Loeffler and Bovaird, 2016).

Incorporating co-production into government service provision is also supported by
specific knowledge and skills on the part of public administrators. Denhardt and
Denhardt (2000, p. 553) write that, “This new world requires new skills of public
servants. It is less about management control and more about brokering, negotiating
and conflict resolution”. Sicilia, Guarini, Sancino, Andreani, and Ruffini (2017) came to
a similar conclusion in their study of co-production in the context of multi-level
governance. They write that:
From a managerial perspective, our case study demonstrated that the
implementation of co-production required new managerial skills and
tools. In particular, public managers were asked to listen to users and
community groups, to mobilize collective resources and knowledge in
order to meet the public interest, and to exercise a meta-governance
role with a view of the public sector that is systemic and oriented toward
final outcomes. Moreover, the main element for guaranteeing capacitybuilding and the sustainability of co-production was the ability of public
managers to manage co-productive fatigue, nurture co-productive
behaviors, and facilitate their continuance even when public funding
ceased. (p. 23)

Others skills mentioned include process and interpersonal skills, communication,
conflict resolution, listening, team building, meeting facilitation, and self-knowledge
(Simrell King et al., 1998; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Ventriss, 2016). Ventriss
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(2016) builds on these points adding that public administrators need an, “Understanding
[of] conflicting administrative tasks, goals, and priorities and how to balance specific
community needs and agency goals.” This skill is one that some public administrators
learn on the job, but it is unlikely that it is part of any formal curriculum or professional
development.

Several researchers have noted that co-production of public services requires that
public administrators work differently than they have traditionally done (Bovaird, 2007;
Loeffler & Bovaird, 2016; Sicilia et al., 2016). Bovaird (2007, p. 858) describes the need
for a, “new public service ethos or compact in which the central role of professionals is
to support, encourage, and coordinate the coproduction capabilities of service users
and the communities in which they live”. This is very different role for public servants
than has traditionally been conceived. Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, p. 535) suggest
that the shift would mean that, “Government acts, in concert with private and nonprofit
groups and organizations, to seek solutions to the problems that communities face. In
this process, the role of government is transformed from one of controlling to one of
agenda setting, bringing the proper players to the table and facilitating, negotiating, or
brokering solutions to public problems...” In this new role relationships and networks
become more important and shared investment and risk recognized. According to
Bovaird (2007), co-production requires that mutual relationships must be built between
public administrators and citizens. These relationship should be reciprocal in which
each party trusts the other, listens to each others’ advice, takes advantage of their
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support and takes risks. This fundamentally changes the role public administrator from
dictating the rules of engagement to a participant engaged in negotiation.

Many of these skills may not have been part of traditional education and Simrell King et
al. (1998) talk about “reeducating administrators” as an approach to support change
toward new approaches to working with citizens. One aspect of this is to help public
administrators shift from seeing themselves as experts to seeing themselves as
partners. This is echoed in Ventriss’ (2016) discussion about the importance of
“subordinating authority/power” so that public administrators do not dominate.

To summarize, the literature review has identified several factors associated with
government use of collective co-production which are outlined in Table A below. The
factors include situations in which capacity or logistical factors render it the best choice.
They also include tolerance for uncertainty, risk aversion, willingness to share power,
presence of appropriate staff and management skills, valuing citizen contribution,
flexible view of professional role, support from senior leaders and presence of
incentives for public administrators. It is also worth noting that the factors are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. In some cases, they can be seen as facets of a
common concept. These connections are highlighted in the table below.
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Table A – Factors associated with government co-production of services

Factors
Organizational Factors
Governance
Lack of governance capacity
to provide the service directly
Governance is complicated by
overlapping and uncertain
jurisdiction
Logitistical
Logistical challenges make
direct service provision
difficult or impossible.
Power Government willingness to
Sharing
share power
Uncertainty
Co-production increases
uncertainty for governments
and reduces it for citizens
Risk Aversion
Organizational pre-disposition
to avoid risk
Incentives
Lack of clear incentives to
engage in co-production
Senior
Support from senior leaders
Leadership
and politicians
Organizational Culture of experimentation
Culture
and learning
Organizational Presence of structures to
Infrastructure
support participation
Individual Factors
Staff Skills
Skills such as facilitation,
negotiation and engagement

Staff Attitudes
and Beliefs

Staff beliefs and attitude
support co-production

Citation

Joshi and Moore (2004)
Bourgon (2011)

Joshi and Moore (2004)

Arnstein (1969) & Ventriss
(2016)
Fledderus, Brandsen &
Honingh (2015)
Voorberg et al., (2015) &
Loeffler and Bovaird (2016)
Voorberg et al. (2015)
Loeffler and Bovaird (2016)

Fledderus et al (2015),
Ventriss (2016)
Bekkers and Tummers (2015)

Bovaird (2007), Loeffler &
Bovaird (2016), Sicilia et al.,
(2016), Denhardt and
Denhardt (2000), Simrell King
et al. (1998), Ventriss (2016).
Voorberg et al., (2015)

Methodology
The research question for this study is to what degree does Hamilton’s Neighbourhood
Action Strategy (NAS) reflect the factors associated with collective co-production
described in the literature? This deductive question will be tested using a case study
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methodology. Van Thiel (2014) notes that the case study methodology can be used for
both deductive and inductive methods, but that reliability of its findings will be limited.
The City of Hamilton’s decision to use a co-production approach for its Neighbourhood
Action Strategy will serve as the case for this study.

This qualitative method was selected so that a holistic approach could be taken to
garner the deepest possible understanding of the NAS and the factors supporting or
hindering its use of co-production. Most research into co-production has been
conducted through case studies (Voorberg et al., 2015; Loeffler and Bovaird, 2016).
Jakobsen’s (2012) randomized field experiment looking at the ability of government to
increase co-production in individuals and Bovaird, Stoker, Jones, Loeffler, and Pinella
Roncancio’s (2016) survey of residents of five UK cities are exceptions. Both studies
explore individual citizens’ participation in co-production using surveys.

While several

factors related to collective co-production have been identified, they are not so precisely
specified that they would lend themselves well to a more empirical study methodology.

Neighbourhood strategies have been embraced by many Ontario municipalities over the
past decade. The City of Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy has been selected
as a case study for several reasons. Hamilton is the 5th largest city in Ontario, so its
experience may be more easily generalizable that that of larger Ontario municipalities
such as Toronto or Ottawa. Hamilton’s has a long history of neighbourhood
development and poverty reduction focusing on community development at the
neighbourhood level which provided a foundation for the City’s strategy.
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The first task in this study will be to confirm to what degree Hamilton’s NAS complies
with the definition of collective co-production put forward by Joshi and Moore (2004).
Their definition is “Institutionalised co-production is the provision of public services
(broadly defined, to include regulation) through regular, long-term relationships between
state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource
contributions (p.40).” The second task is to determine the extent to which the factors
associated with collective coproduction are demonstrated in this case. The case study
will be developed through analyzing documents produced by and about the
Neighbourhood Action Strategy. Documents reviewed include:


Reports to Hamilton City Council;



Evaluation documents; and



Media reports regarding the strategy.

The document analysis was used to understand the structure of the decision-making
process, stated goals, desired impacts, metrics for success, and the anticipated roles of
various participants.

Interviews were conducted with six individuals involved in creating and implementing
the NAS. The participants were current and previous officials with the City of Hamilton
and non-profit agencies that had direct and ongoing involvement in the strategy.
Review of NAS documents revealed that a relatively small number of people were
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involved as central decision makers in the development and implementation of the
strategy.

Interviews were used to understand the perceptions and experiences of participants in
the development and implementation of the NAS as they related to the factors that are
supportive of co-production. This is information that was unlikely to be addressed in the
document analysis. The interviews were semi-structured to ensure that information
regarding the factors was gathered in a consistent manner, yet still allowed flexibility for
the participants to provide rich and in-depth responses. The interviews were recorded
electronically and transcribed in preparation for analysis. Given the relatively small
number of interviews, the analysis was done manually rather than using a qualitative
software program. Participants were informed that their responses would be kept
confidential and that any quotes would not be attributed directly to them 1.

Analysis
Overview of Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy (NAS)
Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy (NAS) should be viewed in the context of the
city’s history of community development and attempts to address poverty and health
inequity. Community development had been taking place in Hamilton’s neighbourhoods
for decades in a variety of forms. The largest community development effort in recent
history is the work of the Hamilton Community Foundation, which funded

1

. Because the research involved human subjects, ethics approval was sought and
obtained through Western University’s Human Research Ethics Board.
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neighbourhood development activities through several programs beginning with
Strengthening Roots: Growing Neighbourhoods. The Hamilton Community
Foundation’s work was complemented by the efforts of the Social Planning and
Research Council and others who undertook development work in other
neighbourhoods in effort to reduce the effects of poverty or issues such as gang
violence in specific neighbourhoods. A common element of this work was the use of
community developers to engage the neighbourhood residents to understand their
needs and help them develop strategies to bring about change. Under Strengthening
Roots: Growing Neighbourhoods, the Hamilton Community Foundation had community
development workers in four neighbourhoods (Neighbourhood Action Evaluation Team,
2016). The community development workers focused their efforts on leadership
development and community building and used a fairly “organic” approach.

In 2004, the Hamilton Community Foundation sharpened its focus on poverty reduction
through the creation of the Tackling Poverty Together grant program. A year later, the
Hamilton Community Foundation broadened its focus on poverty reduction and began
collaborating with the City of Hamilton to develop the Hamilton Roundtable for Poverty
Reduction (Neighbourhood Action Evaluation Team, 2016). The Hamilton Round Table
for Poverty Reduction represented an attempt to focus all sectors of the community on
reducing poverty. As co-convenors, the City of Hamilton and Hamilton Community
Foundation invested significant amounts of funding and lent their credibility to the cause
(Makhoul, 2007). In 2007, the Hamilton Community Foundation deepened its
commitment to poverty reduction by launching the second phase of its Tackling Poverty
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Together grant program. This iteration created a tighter focus by supporting residentled community hubs in six neighbourhoods (Neighbourhood Action Evaluation Team,
2016). Eventually, the work was expanded to two additional neighbourhoods.

In August, 2010, the Hamilton Spectator, Hamilton’s daily newspaper, produced a series
entitled Code Red that provided a reminder that poverty was still a significant problem in
Hamilton. The Code Red series was a collaboration between the Hamilton Spectator
and a McMaster University researcher and involved the analysis of data regarding a
variety of health outcomes by neighbourhood. The multi-part series garnered
widespread attention because of the significant disparities in health outcomes it
identified. One disparity that received a lot of attention was the conclusion that there
was a 21-year difference in life expectancy between one of Hamilton’s wealthiest
neighbourhoods and one of its poorest (The Hamilton Spectator, 2010). To highlight the
contrast further, the Hamilton Spectator wrote of the neighbourhood with the low life
expectancy that the, “same North End neighbourhood would rank 165th in the world for
life expectancy, tied with Nepal, just ahead of Pakistan and worse than India, Mongolia
and Turkmenistan” (The Hamilton Spectator, 2010).

The Code Red series became an impetus for renewed efforts to address poverty and
the associated health disparities in the city. There was a sense that earlier efforts had
not made a significant difference and that a new approach was needed that would have
a greater impact and be sustainable. The idea of a neighbourhood-focused strategy
emerged as potential solution and was ultimately championed by Hamilton’s City
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Manager and General Manager of its social services department. Neighbourhood
initiatives had been undertaken in many North American cities and several examples
were reviewed including Edmonton, Seattle, Vancouver and Winnipeg. Seattle’s
approach was chosen as the model to emulate. Part of the appeal of Seattle’s
approach was that it provided a significant role for residents to shape neighbourhood
plans. At the same time, the neighbourhood plans and planning process were woven
into the City’s planning structure and would inform land-use planning and the delivery of
numerous services provided by the city of Seattle. The desire to deeply engage
residents in shaping the future of their neighbourhood and better integrate the delivery
of municipal services became the underpinning of the drive toward a neighbourhood
strategy in Hamilton. A study participant indicated that, “The intent… was that the NAS
would start to knit together some of these siloed programs because they [municipal
staff] would all be coming to the same tables.”

Building on their collaboration as co-convenors of the Hamilton Roundtable for Poverty
Reduction, the City of Hamilton and Hamilton Community Foundation began exploring
how their efforts could be combined to create a robust neighbourhood strategy. There
was a recognition that they could each play vital, complementary roles. A plan emerged
to coordinate the Hamilton Community Foundation’s work supporting community hubs in
many of the neighbourhoods identified as experiencing some of the greatest health
disparities with the City of Hamilton’s mandate to provide services to these same
neighbourhoods. An arrangement was created whereby the Community Foundation
would merge its community development efforts, including funding for community
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development workers and a small grants program into a new Neighbourhood Action
Strategy that would include a dedicated focus from the City of Hamilton to support the
overarching planning process and use the neighbourhood plans to guide municipal
service delivery.

In the fall of 2010, Hamilton City Council approved, a neighbourhood initiative that was
focused on two key goals, specifically: a) improving “Code Red” neighbourhoods and b)
better integration and focus between the City and community actions at a
neighbourhood level (City of Hamilton, 2011). At the same time, Hamilton’s City Council
approved $2 million from a reserve to support the plan. This was a significant
investment for Hamilton’s Council to make, especially when you consider that they were
approving a concept rather than a detailed plan. One of the respondents noted that,
“many councillors were concerned, a lot of the neighbourhoods in their areas were
being highlighted in Code Red so I think there was a general desire to do something,
politically.” The decision to fund the Neighbourhood Action Strategy occurred
immediately prior to a municipal election. Some study participants wondered if this may
have increased the level of support around the council table, as it may have been
politically popular.

Key activities for the strategy included the development of a team of community
development workers who would support the neighbourhoods to develop action plans
and facilitate the implementation of those plans through the alignment of municipal
investment. The original report also included approval for the hiring of a Director of
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Poverty Reduction and Neighbourhood Initiatives to lead the work. The Office of
Neighbourhood Initiatives was situated in the City Manager’s Office. One of the
respondents noted that this was done, “to establish its importance across the
departments…so you could have city-wide ownership and a culture change.” While it
was recognized that some dedicated staff resources were needed, the intention was to
limit the use of dedicated staff and use existing staff from the various City departments
to the greatest extent possible. The funding for the community development workers
was provided by the Hamilton Community Foundation. The initial report specified that
the neighbourhoods identified as experiencing high levels of inequality in the Code Red
series would be targeted.

Hamilton’s NAS As an Example of Co-production
As was noted above, the goals of Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy were to
improve Code Red neighbourhoods and better integrate City services at the
neighbourhood level. It is important to note that this research project was not designed
to evaluate if these goals were achieved or the effectiveness of co-production in
supporting these goals. This section seeks only to establish whether the
Neighbourhood Action Strategy was indeed intended or designed to incorporate coproduction and to what degree it achieved this.

The report approved by Hamilton City Council in 2011 outlined the approach that was to
be used to work with the neighbourhoods. It does not speak to co-production directly. It
does, however, describe a philosophy and lay out a few best-practices gleaned from
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other communities that speak to communities and government both contributing
resources and working together to produce services. The Council Report detailed the
following best practices that will be followed in Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Strategy:


Community Development Workers are critical human resources that support
‘relationship building’



Plans must be holistic and comprehensive;



A multi-sector approach is key;



Planning must be inclusive and resident led;



Plans must focus on the long-term; and



Measurement of outcomes is critical

This approach positions community development workers as a critical part of the model
of supporting the neighbourhoods through their own process to develop a
neighbourhood plan. The report also states that the community development workers
will work from an Assets-Based Community Development Perspective. Assets-Based
Community Development was developed by Kretzmann and McKnight (1996) as an
alternative to “needs-based planning.” In traditional needs-based planning, attention is
placed on identifying needs or deficits within a community and then identifying
strategies to address them. The strategies generally originate outside the community in
question and are brought into the community. Assets-based planning starts from the
premise that every community has assets and that they should be the starting point for
planning. It also holds that planning should be inward focusing starting with the
residents and then engaging external resources to help implement the plan.
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Assets-Based Community Development can be seen to turn traditional conceptions of
planning and service delivery upside down. Instead of starting with a government or an
agency planning services based on their mandate, it starts with the community and the
residents. Through a structured process, communities establish their priorities and then
seek partners to help them deliver on them. Partners join with residents to deliver
services that fit with their goals through ongoing interaction. Consistent with this
approach, the Neighbourhood Action Strategy worked to encourage broad groups of
residents to come together to develop the plans. One interview participant noted that,
“A lot of the theory on neighbourhood change is that if it is not resident-led it doesn’t
have the staying power.” The same participant described the nature of the plans as
they were originally envisioned saying, “The plans did not have any parameters around
only being about the city. The question we asked residents was pretty simple, what are
the things we can work together on to make this a better neighbourhood in which you
can live, work, play, and learn?” If ideas emerged that related to education or
healthcare, the intention was to support linkages to the institutions and governments
that provided those services. It also specified that the plans belonged to the
neighbourhood and that Hamilton’s Council was not approving them, but rather
endorsing them and directing staff to support their implementation.

This arrangement certainly has elements of co-production as the relationship involves
residents bringing forward their assets (resources) and those of their neighbourhood to
work with governments to plan and deliver services. This is especially reflective of
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Loeffler and Bovaird’s (2016) definition of co-production which includes “public services,
service users and communities making better use of each other’s assets and resources
to achieve better outcomes or improved efficiency.”

Study participants indicated that there was relatively little resistance to the approval of
and use of this approach. As one of the study participants noted, “It was hard to be
against the Neighbourhood Action Strategy.” Given the attention from the Hamilton
Spectator’s Code Red Series, action of some kind was required to begin addressing the
disparities in income and health outcomes across neighbourhoods. While Council did
invest $2 million from a reserve in the project, much of the funding to operationalize the
strategy would come from other sources including the Hamilton Community Foundation
and other partners such as McMaster University. This reduced the cost of the
commitment by Council. As was noted earlier, the neighbourhood strategy was
approved immediately prior to the 2010 municipal election, making this a hard item turn
down. Councilors also had some cover as the new council could always reverse the
decision. While support was widespread, it was not without some trepidation. A
councilor is quoted in the Ancaster News saying, “We like this, but we are nervous of
the outcomes” (Ancaster News, 2011).

A significant factor in the approval of the strategy was the leadership of Hamilton’s City
Manager. All of those interviewed referenced his support as being critical to getting the
initiative off the ground. He had a very good relationship with council and the strength
of his support would likely have reassured councilors who may have had doubts. His
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leadership would also have been influential with the members of his Senior
Management Team who controlled important financial and human resources to support
the initiative. One of the people interviewed noted that, “The buy in for it [the strategy]
was from all the senior management team, the senior managers were all interested in
how they could participate and be part of this. It didn’t get pigeon holed as a planning
approach or a social services approach or a physical infrastructure approach.” Support
from senior leadership is one of the factors identified in the literature as supporting the
co-production of services.

Implementation of Co-production Approach
While support was perceived to be strong at the outset of the initiative, it is worth
considering that Councilors and City officials did not fully understand the implications of
this new approach as it was being proposed. The new “resident-led” approach was a
break from traditional ways of government interacting with their residents. The May 9,
2011 report to Hamilton’s Emergency and Community Services committee describes
the Neighbourhood Strategy what this new approach means for the City of Hamilton.
“The Neighbourhood Development Strategy seeks to define a new
way of working with residents at the neighbourhood level. Allowing
residents to lead planning processes, supported by the technical
knowledge of City staff and community partners, will ensure the
building of more holistic plans with more ownership of the plans by
the residents. The Neighbourhood Development Strategy will also
provide a framework for stronger cross-departmental alignment.”
As was noted earlier, the Hamilton Community Foundation had been working with
neighbourhoods for more than a decade. Its work had taken a fairly “organic approach”
and informed the implementation of the Neighbourhood Action Strategy. The Social
Planning and Research Council’s experience had been similar in its neighbourhood
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work. Under the Neighbourhood Action Strategy, planning could unfold differently in
each neighbourhood’s distinct context, yet there were some common expectations in
terms of broad engagement with residents and transparency about the process.

Interview participants noted that the actual strategy evolved over time. In 2010, Council
approved the development of a strategy and in May, 2011 they approved a strategy that
was still relatively high level. Following approval of the development of a strategy
conversations began with existing neighbourhood planning tables, many of which had
been supported by the Hamilton Community Foundation. While there was a desire to
let the process unfold by working in partnership with the neighbourhood residents, there
were “imperatives” to begin producing outcomes.

Introducing the City of Hamilton into the mix created some opportunities and challenges
for residents, partners and City staff. Several respondents identified that the City had
traditionally taken a more limited view of what it meant to work with residents. It would
often involve one way communication with residents informing them of changes. In
other cases, it focused on seeking preferences between pre-determined options. This
new way of working required City staffers to become participants in community planning
processes rather than its leaders. One of the interview participants stated that, “sitting
down at the table for a long period of time and planning out the actions that the
neighbourhoods wanted to see happen and then taking those actions back into the
municipal structure was very, very new.”
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Some staff embraced this new approach to working with neighbourhood residents. For
them, it was consistent with their values and belief in the value of citizen participation.
Three of the study participants noted that some municipal staff “just believed” in the
philosophy and approach embodied in the NAS and did everything they could to help.
One of the study participants conveyed that, “The NAS legitimized certain approaches
and practices” that previously had felt undervalued or even forbidden.” At its best, the
strategy and the neighbourhood focus was described as giving people latitude to do
what makes sense for residents and step outside of confining silos or processes. A
study participant indicated that, “…there are many people within the city who could step
outside of their normal processes to move things forward.”

Several interview participants noted that this approach did not appear to be consistent
with some municipal staff members’ values and beliefs. One interview subject noted
that, “Some staff got it, but many did not. Some thought they were already doing it and
some didn’t value it.” The incongruence with staff beliefs and values at times led to
resistance to working with residents in this new way. Another interview subject was
even more blunt stating that, “We don’t trust people to make good decisions.” This lack
of trust translated into resistance to letting residents play a central role in planning or
participating in implementation.

One of the participants talked about the value of this approach to local politicians. The
local planning process was seen by some municipal politicians as helpful because ideas
had already been vetted by residents, allowing them to vote for it knowing support was
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widespread. It was suggested that it also created a different dynamic when specific
proposals were brought to Council for approval. One study participant stated that,
“Council really enjoyed the sense that the community was in
favour of this en masse. This made it easier for them to approve
elements we would bring forward later whether it was funding or
partnership opportunities because it was something that was
attached to something with broad support, the umbrella of
protection was greater.”

The same study participant went on to say that a council member commented that they,
“have never seen this many people in council chamber who are for something.”

Transitioning from planning to implementation was identified as the time when
challenges became more prevalent. Difficulty relinquishing power and control were
among the most common challenges identified by interview participants. Part of this
was reticence relinquishing control of agenda setting and decision-making. A study
participant indicated that, ”I had many colleagues at the city incensed early on because
of where the plans were going because it did not address what they saw as the real
needs.” Another participant observed that, “In some cases, we didn’t let go” and that
this is problematic because for this approach to work because “we need to be equal at
the table.”

While the resident-led planning process had some advantages for politicians, three of
the study participants mentioned that councillors found it challenging. In several
situations, community plans contained priorities that did not resonate with the councillor
for that neighbourhood. This was seen as putting the councillor in the position of

31
needing to vote against her residents’ preferences to see preferred projects brought to
fruition.
Closely related to the issue of power and control is the perceived threat to municipal’s
staff’s professional identify and expertise. This can be seen as being related to power,
as professional identify can conveys a certain power and authority. For the purposes of
this study, it is being treated separately. Three of the study participants touched on
issues regarding municipal staff and their role. In some cases, it was reported that
municipal staff felt they knew what needed to happen and there was concern about
having their work driven by residents. As trained and experienced professionals, some
felt they should not need to spend so much time engaging residents. One interview
participant recalled that, “some municipal staff wanted to go off and do their work, but
we had tough conversations about needing to continue to work with the
neighbourhoods.” Another study participant summed it up saying, “I think it was just
about learning how we are going to deal differently with neighbourhoods.” Part of the
difficulty was identified as municipal staff valuing professional expertise over the
experience and preferences of residents. A study participant provided the following
example, “Engineers would say, I know how to build a bridge, or I am an architectural
designer, I know how to build the archway to this park, why do I need to work with the
community to do that?”

Staff skill and knowledge of how to work with the residents was noted in four of the six
interviews as supporting or inhibiting the NAS’ goals. It was acknowledged that some
municipal staff already possessed the relationship-building and facilitation skills required
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to work effectively with the neighbourhood planning groups. Other staff did not acquire
the skills as part of their training or work experience. One interview subject stated that,
“We take it for granted that you can take anyone and drop them into a group and they
will be able to manage.” Another interview subject noted that, “There were just people
who didn’t buy in because they didn’t understand it. There were people who just didn’t
buy-in because they didn’t agree with it. But there were people who just didn’t
understand it and how it would work.” In some cases, staff members were much more
comfortable relying on technical knowledge to address some neighbourhood concerns
rather than engaging residents further. In order to work differently with neighbourhoods
and residents, one of the interview subjects mused that perhaps municipal staff need to
unlearn some of their training. Two of the respondents identified that training for
municipal staff should have been part of the NAS as it may have helped increase their
sense of comfort and competency in working directly with residents. One interview
participant stated, “I think we should have done some staff training. We should have
held some real focused workshops on what community engagement was.”

Risk aversion was only mentioned by two of the interview participants. One of the
respondents identified that risk was a constant discussion throughout the
implementation of the strategy and the actions within the plan. While risk aversion was
not identified as having stopped any activities, it was identified as requiring lots of staff
time and attention. One of the respondents indicated that, “Some things we would have
thought would have been very basic like having residents meet in a community centre
became a quagmire of risk management…and sometimes it felt like the whole strategy
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was being driven by risk management.” It is important to note that risk management
was cited as a bigger problem with seemingly small actions, while large scale actions
such as the development of a three acre piece of land in Hamilton’s east end did not
raise significant risk concerns.

The study participant who raised the issue of risk management also mentioned that
some staff were hesitant to push boundaries because they perceived their jobs might be
at risk. This came up in a discussion about the fact it was hard to please all the parties
involved in the NAS and that when residents were displeased, they would often contact
their councillor. While staff do not report to councillors, it was suggested that some staff
perceived that making decisions that might be unpopular with residents could potentially
affect their career.

The interviews revealed some challenges for the residents who participated in the local
planning processes as well. One of the themes was that residents experienced
frustration when faced with municipal and institutional regulations and processes. After
being engaged in community planning process, some residents became frustrated with
how slowly things moved or, in some cases, that they did not happen at all. While the
NAS was intended to create new ways of municipal staff working with residents, many
existing processes remained in place. Funding was available through the Hamilton
Community Foundation’s small grants process and $2 million was available from
Council, but many expenses were covered through the City’s regular capital budgeting
process which is planned over a 10-year period. One study participant commented,
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“Then the residents come back saying, there’s government again putting up obstacles,
all the bureaucracy of government again.” In some instances, these barriers were tied
to legal requirements such as land use planning, construction permits or municipal
procurement by-laws. Several of the study participants referenced efforts to explain
“how government works” to residents. One study participant provided the following
example of an attempt to explain the challenges,
“We had one of our landscape managers come down one day and
explain why it [the process] is so slow. He reminded them there are
147 pieces of legislation that could impact a major redevelopment
of park, everything from usual things like run-off and through to the
migratory pattern of birds.”

The discussion above regarding the receptiveness of municipal staff suggests that not
all the barriers may have come from legal mandates or other immutable sources. In
some instances, staff may have been blindly following protocols and procedures. In
other situations, they may not have felt they had the latitude or discretion to use a
different process with the neighbourhood residents and the fulfillment of the
neighbourhood plans.

All those interviewed indicated that these challenges were not fully anticipated by the
City of Hamilton and Hamilton Community Foundation. Three of the interview
participants talked about ways in which additional support could have been provided to
residents to help educate them about policy-making and bureaucratic decision making.
“I don’t know that we spent enough time building the infrastructure to help the residents
and city staff understand that interface,” said one interview participant. While residents
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still may have felt disappointment, the feeling among interview participants was that
education might have allowed residents to put timelines or barriers into perspective.

A related theme, is frustration among both residents and municipal staff linked to clear
roles and responsibilities. As the project moved from the development of plans to their
implementation conflicts emerged over the role the residents and resident planning
groups were to play. Some felt they should have the ability to direct resources and
staff. Since residents had developed the plans, they expected to remain involved
throughout the development of projects such as park re-development. This did not
always happen as municipal staff reverted to old patterns. Having consulted, they set
off to do their work. One of the interview participants reflected that, “If you are codeveloping something I think there needs to be expectations on the roles and
responsibilities all parties have.“ Another indicated that, “I don’t think we prepared
residents for those conversations very well and, quite frankly, I don’t think we prepared
staff for those conversations very well.” All acknowledged that these conflicts were
predictable in hindsight, but were not apparent at the beginning given the NAS’ iterative
development.

Another theme was that neighbourhood plan contained, and by extension, that some of
the resident expectations were unrealistic. It was intimated that the mismatch in
expectations caused some frustration on the part of some residents. Two of the
interview participants suggested that there should have been more clarity at the
beginning of the planning process regarding the parameters of the plans. Two
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participants also mentioned the plans being naïve about what government can and can’t
do and therefore included actions that were hard for governments to action in a timely
manner, if at all. Examples of unrealistic expectations included the ability of
governments to make large investments in infrastructure that would serve only a small
number of people such or the ability to impact broader social trends such as
unemployment at the neighbourhood level. One interview subject noted this as being a
concern for municipal councilors, stating that, “at times they wondered if we had created
a monster,” suggesting that expectations and demands were fueled through the
strategy. Certainly, some of the expectations may have been a bit naïve. It is also
possible that some of the perceived lack of realism didn’t reflect the inability of
government to act in certain areas, but rather the will to do so.

Another facet of this was that in some cases residents were interested in issues in
which municipal government does not play a central role. Examples were cited of
residents wanting to work on affordable housing, job creation or education. Five of the
six interview subjects referenced this being a challenge with residents. One interview
participant felt that residents did not fully grasp the breadth of some of their requests
and noted that, “We are government and there are some things we can’t do.”

The interviews raise different interpretations of this. The resident concerns can be seen
as unrealistic demands that don’t recognize the realities of how governments work.
Another is to see these requests as being political or turning into advocacy. One
interview subject stated that, “Housing issues are real, there is an affordability problem
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that is having a deleterious effect on low-income tenants in these neighbourhoods. That
issue really started to gain some momentum.” The interview participant went on to say
that this issue was seen by the leadership of the NAS as advocacy and too
controversial and was to be avoided. The same interview subject noted that “If you start
out trying to respond to Code Red, but you just want to do nice things in
neighbourhoods, then these things come around and you can’t run away from it.” Three
of the interview subjects suggested that this should have been anticipated as a logical
outcome of using a resident-led or co-production approach. Once residents were asked
how things could be different and trusted that their voice mattered, they articulated what
was most important to them.

All the interview subjects recognized this tension. Some saw NAS leadership as
having a limited tolerance for the controversy generated by neighbourhood residents
desire to engage with these broader issues. One participant indicated that, “The city is
a little less tolerant of tough stuff that can come. Governments, municipal governments,
need to figure out how to do this but adjust their tolerance for the challenges that might
arise.” Others identified this as inappropriate or misguided advocacy on the part of
residents. The sense was that the raw social activism was going to do more harm than
good.

The community development workers in the community to support the neighbourhood
residents in planning were described as being at the center of this tension. They were
an official part of the NAS infrastructure and were seen by both institutional partners

38
and residents as “their people.” The community development workers were largely
funded by the Hamilton Community Foundation which gave them some independence
from the City. While they were not employed by the City, they did have a unique status
as a part of the interface between the City and the residents. The community
development workers were charged with helping implement the resident-led approach
to working in the neighbourhoods and actively promoted that the plans belonged to the
residents. As part of the interface between residents and the City bureaucracy, they
heard very directly from residents about what was important to them and attempted to
translate that into bureaucratic action. One interview subject described the community
developers as being put in an “untenable position,” indicating it was very hard for them
to balance these different perspectives. In some instances, residents looked to
community developers to be on their side which had to be balanced against the need to
interpret bureaucratic process. At times, the community development workers were
perceived to swing too far toward the community interests. An interview subject
described a situation in which a community development worker joined residents in
protesting municipal policy at City Hall. The interview subject went on to say, “And I
think we had some CDs and residents who fancied themselves as revolutionaries and
who thought this was going to be the chance to do that.” The interview subjects differed
in their opinion of where to draw the line on the community development worker role.
The structure of the community developer role changed two times during the course of
the strategy. The first restructuring of the role brought all the community development
workers together under the leadership of the Social Planning and Research Council.
The Community developers were previously reporting to three separate organizations
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and it was felt that rates of pay and expectations should be standardized. The second
time, the community developments workers were brought into the Hamilton Community
Foundation as process of reviewing the NAS began.

Findings
Based on the description in council reports and the interviews, Hamilton’s
Neighbourhood Action Strategy was intended to be a form of co-production. While the
NAS used the term “resident-led” to describe the intended approach, the interviews
suggest it reflects Bovaird’s (2007) definition of co-production including its focus on
citizens and government both contributing resources to the delivery of public services.
The term encompassed the idea that the neighbourhood plans belonged to the
residents. Resident ownership of the plans was reinforced throughout the planning
process and championed by the Community Development Workers.

Eleven neighbourhood plans were ultimately produced through a significant amount of
engagement with residents. The plans contained a wide array of initiatives ranging from
development of low-income home repair programs to park clean ups. There was
agreement from all but one of the interview participants that the resident-led element did
not live up to its ideal. There was common agreement about the basic idea of working
with neighbourhood residents to understand needs, but all participants acknowledged
that there was no clear sense at the outset of what it meant to be resident-led making it
difficult to assess to what extent the NAS was intended to truly represent a form of coproduction.
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The fact that the roles and expectations of all parties in implementation was not fleshed
out in advance also created practical challenges for the NAS. Interview participants
confirmed that the initial focus was on the planning process and that many of the
implementation issues were not considered initially other than in broad strokes. One of
the interview participants stated that, “I think that “resident-led” language became
problematic in the later phases of the NAS because we didn’t really define it other than
to say that the actions in the neighbourhood plan will be developed by residents for
residents.” Another interview participated stated that, “I think we were better holding it
[resident-led] as a value rather than a practical reality. I remember the heated
conversations [with someone saying] you can’t keep calling this resident led if you keep
telling us how this is going to be.” This disconnect between citizen expectations and
staff led to acrimony and to some extent, a breakdown of the relationship between staff
and residents that had been built up through the planning process.

While many of the factors identified in the literature could been seen in the case study,
some were not present. In terms of organizational factors, Joshi and Moore’s (2004)
contention that co-production often arises from capacity or governance issues was only
partially supported. None of the information suggested that co-production was being
used due to the lack of capacity on the part of the City of Hamilton. Neither were
governance issues, as defined by Joshi and Moore, a factor as the City did not lack
legitimacy to govern. If the definition of governance issues was extended to include
complex policy issues with overlapping jurisdiction, then governance issues could be
seen as a part of the motivation. In the case study, it was recognized that the City was

41
only one among many levels of government and organizations that provided services in
the neighbourhoods. The original scope of the plans was not limited to services
provided only by the City of Hamilton. The ability of the City and neighbourhoods to
navigate this complex policy environment, however, appeared to be one of the greatest
challenges.

Flagging support from senior managers and city councillors likely reflected, in part, a
resistance to sharing power. Challenges giving up control was referenced in several of
the interviews. Reticence to share power may also have been manifest in the two
biggest inhibiters to continued co-production which were described as “unrealistic
expectations” on the part of residents or residents getting political or engaging in
advocacy. It is difficult to fully unpack what was meant when interview participants used
these terms. It is quite possible that some of neighbourhood requests for services
would be hard for a government to justify based on a small number of people being
served. Some of the issues may have indeed lain outside of the control of municipal
government such as housing or education over which municipal governments only have
partial control. But it is not clear why municipal government was not able to work with
residents to help advocate for these priorities to be addressed by other levels of
government or institutions. Whether it was that the demands were excessive or that
there was insufficient political will to address them, the issues created a significant
challenge with which NAS leadership had to contend. In some cases, when residents
did not see the progress for which the hoped, they pushed back. Based on the
interviews, this response became very challenging for NAS leadership to manage both

42
with residents and with politicians. Ultimately, it may be an expression of challenges
power sharing with residents. One of the respondents reflected that,
“The reality is that residents in neighbourhoods don’t have any power.
In some ways, the NAS tried to give people some of the power that the
municipality had. It was really a drop in the bucket compared to the
financial and legislative power the municipality has. They gave away
the tiniest little droplet of that power.”

The issue of risk aversion emerged in the case study as well. It was only mentioned by
a couple of the respondents, but it was identified as a critical issue by those who raised
it. Risk was discussed both in terms of the desire to protect the organization from risk,
but also that some staff may have felt that working so closely with residents also
created risks to their jobs. The discussion of risk is a clear expression of a lack of
incentives for staff to engage in co-production. If staff had felt that the organization
provided sufficient incentives such as using co-production as a criterion on which
performance would be evaluated positively, the risk calculation might have felt different
for staff. In this case, they were clearly lacking, although incentives were not identified
in those exact terms by respondents.

The endorsement of senior leadership was found to be supportive of the use of coproduction. The co-production approach was championed by the City Manager and
high level support was in place around the senior management table which likely made
Council approval of the process much easier. Approval was also potentially facilitated
by political factors including The Hamilton Spectator’s release of the Code Red Series
and an upcoming election. The interviews did indicate that senior level support became
strained as the NAS entered the implementation phase. It was at this point that human
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resources were required from senior managers and that it was identified that councillors
felt pressure to support priorities that emerged from the planning process rather than
their preferred initiatives.

A lack of organizational infrastructure to support co-production became problematic in
the implementation of Hamilton’s NAS. There was support in the form of community
developers who were tasked with supporting neighbourhoods in the development of
their plans and city staff were encouraged to participate in their implementation. Some
key forms of organizational infrastructure were missing such as clear governance
structure. Respondents noted that the NAS developed organically and that issues of
governance that might arise during implementation were not thoroughly discussed. This
ultimately led to conflict over expectations of how decision-making would occur.
Additionally, respondents noted that civic education might have been helpful for
neighbourhood participants and that more in-depth education about citizen engagement
might have better prepared city staff for the challenges that would lay ahead.

A number of organizational factors were not seen in this case study. Uncertainty for
public administrators regarding the outcome of the process did not come up on the
interviews. It is possible that uncertainty was indeed an issue, but it was simply
expressed using different language. Organizational culture, as defined by Ventriss
(2016), did not come up other. None of the respondents identified a lack of a culture of
experimentation and learning as being problematic.
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Individual level factors were clearly identified as being important in supporting or
hindering the use of co-production in the case study. Using a resident-led or a coproduction approach was mentioned by all interview participants as reflecting a different
way of working from traditional approaches to public administration as discussed by
Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) and Bourgon (2011). This different approach was
described as exciting to some staff who engaged enthusiastically with residents. Other
staff did not see the value of working with residents which subsequently limited the
approach’s effectiveness which is consistent with Voorberg et al’s (2015) writing.
Interview participants noted that working so closely with residents presented conflicts
with professional identity for some staff which is reflective of Loeffler and Bovaird’s
(2016) findings. This was identified as being a challenge to co-production, but did not
stop it entirely.

Conclusion
Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy was found to have been intended as a form
of co-production. It was noted that there was a lack of clarity about roles and
responsibilities at the outset and that staff and residents had different ideas of what this
might mean. Factors associated with the use of co-production were identified and
classified as relating to the organization or individual staff. This study examined the
extent to which the factors associated with co-production were present in the case
study. Many organizational factors associated with co-production were found to be
present including underlying governance issues, reticence for government to share
power, risk aversion, leadership support, a lack of incentives and organizational
infrastructure were all found to be important. Individual staff attitudes and skills were
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found to be important factors supporting or hindering co-production. Several factors
identified in the literature were not found to be present in the case study. These
included limited government capacity, logistical challenges, low tolerance for uncertainty
and organizational culture of experimentation.
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